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Abstract  
The purchase of a residential home carries the risk of adjacent properties being rezoned in a manner 
creating negative externalities reducing the value of nearby residential homes. In most municipalities, 
appeals against rezoning are a costly and time consuming activity both for appellants and the public 
administrative bureaucracy. In this paper we establish the framework to analyze the creation of a 
residential insurance arrangement that has the potential to reduce the costs associated with appeals to 
restrict rezoning.  
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1. Introduction 
An important part of land use planning in most urban communities in the industrial world is zoning; an 
ordinance setting out the consumption or production activities permitted on a specific parcel of land. 
Zoning ordinances are not fixed over time and the possibility of a change to the zoning designation for 
a parcel of land exists in most communities. It is a “possibility” because a change in the zoning 
designation of a parcel of land requires an application by the owner of the land (or prospective owner 
of the parcel of land) to a local government or its agency, to alter the zoning ordinance of the property. 
Local government councils may alter the zoning designation of a parcel of land exclusive of ownership 
to facilitate land use planning. In most instances, a proposal to rezone a parcel of land is made public 
with an opportunity for landowners adjacent to the parcel of land in question to comment on the 
proposed change in land use designation.  
Zoning regulations or ordinances, particularly at the municipal level, are the most direct and effective 
way to impact the location of residential, commercial, agriculture and industrial activity. Numerous 
studies have examined the impact of zoning on the distribution of population, transportation routes, 
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988housing prices and private and social welfare. Much of the earlier literature is captured in a 
thorough and insightful analysis found in Fischel (1985). In their detailed review of the theory and 
empirical evidence on the welfare effects of zoning, Pogodzinski and Sass (1990) pay particular 
attention to the effects of zoning on population movement from both the supply and demand sides of 
the land market and the behavior of rent-seeking agents.  
The application from a land owner or potential land owner to rezone a parcel of land is motivated by a 
desire on the part of the owner or potential owner to maximize her/his wealth. However, altering the 
legal use of a parcel of land may also increase or decrease the wealth of other land owners due to the 
creation of positive and/or negative externalities associated with the new activity on the rezoned parcel 
of land. The possibility of such externalities occurring generates interest on the part of those adjacent to 
the land in question to participate in support of or opposition to the proposal, the latter generating most 
of the activity.  
The process leading to a decision to rezone or not rezone a parcel of land at the local government and 
higher-tier government in some instances is time-consuming and often delays land use change for 
months and even years. The costs are private and public, the former involving prolonged time 
commitments and lawyers’ fees while the latter encompasses time costs on the part of local public 
administration staff and possibly appeals to higher levels of decision-making bodies. Landowners who 
believe a rezoning decision will reduce their wealth due to negative externalities will challenge zoning 
authorities and commit substantial resources to prevent rezoning.  
Purchasing a residential home is a risky investment. Fire, theft, flooding and severe weather can 
quickly reduce a homeowner’s wealth. In addition to risk mitigation, most homeowners can purchase 
insurance to offset the loss in wealth due to these factors. In a setting where zoning ordinances can 
change, creating negative externalities leading to a decline in property values, the purchase of a 
residential home is also risky. An alternative to the costly and often unpredictable outcome of zoning 
appeals and possible court actions is third party insurance against a decline in the value of residential 
real estate. The idea of insuring against the possibility of property devaluation has been examined by 
several authors over the past four decades. Marcus and Taussig (1970), Breton (1973), Auld (1982), 
Schiller (1995) and Fischel (2004). Marcus and Taussig argued that the United States should establish a 
Home Owners Insurance Corporation (HOIC), to offset the market imperfections and distributional 
considerations that arise when home prices decline due to unforeseen factors such as the “…decline in 
the overall demand for the area in which the property is located.” In addition, “…sharp fluctuations in 
evaluation … range and quality of services provided by the local government,” or “…unforeseen 
movement of a large industry out of a community.” (p. 406). Market failure arises when local 
governments discontinue services or grant construction permits for commercial enterprises in 
residential areas. The authors also note that insuring home owners against a decline in home prices 
would provide stability in the real estate market and by extension, finance markets as well. Yarmolinski 
(1971) advanced a similar proposal for a home equity insurance plan. Fischel (2004) points out the 
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topic of externalities and zoning traditionally focussed on the price and welfare effects of zoning 
ordinances and how housing (largely) markets would operate in the absence of zoning laws. While 
zoning laws are not property rights, homeowners, he notes, view them as a contract between society 
and the individual homeowner. Moreover, while the power to establish or change zoning rests with 
local and state/provincial authorities through elected or appointed boards, they are ultimately 
responsible to those who possess the property right of private ownership.  
None of these studies have explored the idea of insurance against rezoning in a framework that 
simultaneously considers applications for rezoning, rent seeking behavior, negotiation and third party 
real estate insurance. The focus of this paper is the response of landowners to the uncertainty of the 
regulations governing land use and how agents respond to the prospect of negative externalities that 
impact wealth, income and utility.  
Our paper provides insight related into (a) the theoretical framework that identifies why there are no 
market or quasi-market solutions to the negative externality impact on non-conforming land use, (b) the 
simultaneous creation of negative and positive externalities in the presence of zoning non-conformity, (c) 
the challenge to design fair insurance and (d) quantification of the high cost of solving the equity and 
efficiency issues by way of third party intervention.  
Section 2 of the paper provides a model to explore how agents, in this case homeowners, located in one 
space and in one state of zoning, may respond to a change in the initial state to one where a nearby 
property is rezoned for a non-conforming use leading to a decline in the value of at least one of the 
homeowners property (McDonald & McMillan, 2003). Political solutions, negotiation and third party 
solutions are explored in this setting. In section 3, we examine the issue of homeowner insurance in the 
context of expected utility theory and fair insurance, demonstrating that theoretically, insurance is a 
viable solution. Section 4 focuses on issues related to implementing zoning insurance. The final section 
provides a brief conclusion.  
 
2. A Simple Model 
Assume a community consists of a set of R properties ܴ݅	 ൌ 	ݎ1, ݎ2, … . . ݎ݊ in a given spatial setting 
regulated by zoning laws stipulating activities than are permitted in the space. Each property has an 
identical market value of $ ܸ݅. 
Assume there is a proposal to rezone the ݆	ݐ݄ property permitting an activity that would generate both 
positive and negative externalities. For the subset of properties, Ȓ	ሼ	ݎ1, ݎ2, … ݎ݆	ሽ there is a positive 
externality leading to an increase in the market value of the property, ∆V, for each element in the set. 
For the remainder of the properties, Ȑሼ	ݎ݆ ൅ 1,……ݎ݊}, there is a negative externality leading to a 
decline in property value, -∆V* (Note 2). There are several possible scenarios in this situation. If the 
zoning is approved and  
                         ∑ ∆ܸ ൐ ∑ ሺെ∆ܸ ∗ሻ௡௝ାଵ௝ଵ                               (1) 
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there is a net increase in the total value of property in the community. Whether or not the rezoning 
occurs depends on the rules governing changes in zoning. 
2.1 Local Council Decision  
Assume the agency charged with approving or rejecting an application for rezoning is fully-informed of 
the monetary value of the consequences for all property owners if a rezoning application is approved or 
rejected. Furthermore, the goal for the agency is to maximize the total value of property in the 
community. In such a (unlikely) situation, approval or rejection would be automatic. However, in the 
absence of a prescribed goal but with perfect information, consider the scenario where the application 
from the Ȓ owners is reviewed by an elected council or board. The agency is aware of those whose 
property values would increase and those where the value would decline. The persuasiveness and 
representation of both sides will determine the outcome of the vote which could result in approval of 
the application for rezoning leading to a net increase in total property value or rejection of the rezoning 
application thus sustaining the status quo. 
2.2 Referendum 
In place of a council or board decision-making system, consider a referendum allowing all property 
owners to vote in favor or against a zoning change. Suppose the outcome of the proposed rezoning of 
the	݆ݐ݄ property would result in a net decline in total property value in the community.  
                           ∑ ∆ܸ ൏ ∑ ሺെ∆ܸ ∗ሻ௡௝ାଵ௝ଵ                                   (2) 
If the subset of home owners who gain from the rezoning constitute the majority of homeowners, a 
referendum would result in an aggregate loss in property value. More formally,  
                																														∑ ܻ௝௥ୀଵ  >∑ ܰ௡௥ୀ௝ାଵ                                     (3) 
where Y is a yes vote and N is a no vote. If, however  
             																																					∑ ܻ௡௥ୀ௝ାଵ ൐ ∑ ܰ௝௥ୀଵ ,                                   (4) 
the referendum will fail, “protecting” those who would lose but denying the opportunity for an increase 
total property value.   
2.3 Negotiation 
Assume the outcome described in equation 2 is negative: a net loss in total property value. 
If the community has established a rule permitting Coase-type negotiations, those who stand to lose 
could offer a payment of $B to the potential “winners” where $B=>$∆V and $B<-$∆V*. Consider the 
following example where there is a set of five home owners, ݎ1, ݎ2	 … . ݎ5  where each suffers a loss 
of $ 10K in property value if the rezoning is allowed for a total $ 50K loss for the group. The remainder 
of the population, a set of twenty five home owners, ݎ6, ݎ7… . ݎ30   would each gain $ 1K as a 
result of the rezoning of the 	݆ݐ݄ property for a total gain of $ 25K. The net loss to the community is 
$-25K if all participants voted on the rezoning of application of the ݆ݐ݄ property. 
If there was no vote, the expected losers could negotiate a payment to each of the expected winners of 
∆ܤ	݅		 ൌ 	$	1.1ܭ or in the aggregate, ∑∆ܤ݅ ൌ $	27.5 ൐ ∆ܸ			. Compared to the outcome where the 
rezoning is approved, the payment from the potential losers represents a net gain. The five losers have 
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lost $ 27.5K but that is less than the $ 50K they would lose if the rezoning was approved. Negotiations 
and bargaining leads to both groups being better off compared to the rezoning option. Such bargaining 
is fraught with difficulties, notably the intractability as the number of players increase. In addition, 
bargaining is not without significant transaction costs.  
There are administrative limitations to the options above. It is unlikely that elected councils have 
perfect knowledge about the value of the gains and losses of a proposed zoning change. If this were to 
occur, the political fallout may persuade a council not to proceed with a zoning application. At the 
heart of the issue are the unexpected losses that occur when rezoning is approved in world where 
property owners expect the permanency of zoning. But value-enhancement rezoning may also trigger a 
decline in other property values due to negative externalities (Note 3).  
The prospect of rezoning can be viewed in a simple state contingent model of uncertainty. A property 
owner faces two states, ܣଵ and ܣଶ. ܣଵ is a state where a set of land use policies is constant. ܣଶ	is a 
state where the use of at least one parcel of land,		ܴ݆, is altered by rezoning the use of that property, 
resulting in a reduction or increase in the value of a given property owner. If π is the probability that 
state 1 persists, ∆W represents a change in the value of the property, then the expected property value 
of any property owner is  
                       ܧ∆ܹ௜  = π ∆ ஺ܹభ	௜ 	+ (1-ߨ )∆ ஺ܹమ	௜ 				                            (5) 
0<∆W<0 (Note 4) 
Once a rezoning application has been announced, each individual home owner must consider her 
response. If the proposal is expected to lead to a decline in the value of property for one or more 
property owners, it is not uncommon for a concerted effort by those whose wealth will be impacted 
negatively to take action to prevent approval of the application for a zoning change. Acting alone or in 
concert with others whose wealth will be impacted negatively by the change this response is not 
without Costs (C) in terms of time and legal fees. In other words, expenditure to oppose a zoning 
change has the potential to change the probability the proposed change will be approved (Note 5). 
 
3. Insurance  
The purchase of land where there is a zoning plan which can be altered is similar to the purchase of 
land where there is no zoning with one exception. Where there is no zoning, there is no “advance 
warning” that land use may change: applications for re zoning are usually accompanied by notice of 
intent where land owners adjacent to the land considered for rezoning are invited to comment on the 
application. If a prospective homeowner is aware of the possibility an adjacent property could be 
rezoned to a non-conforming use generating negative externalities, she/he would take that into account 
when purchasing the property. In the case of re-zoning, there is always the chance that the application 
for a non-conforming use will be rejected. If, in the no-zoning case, the purchase of land for residential 
home ownership were followed by the sale of adjacent land for a non-conforming use, the distribution 
of income would be altered. However, it cannot be said a priori that this would result in a Pareto 
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improvement or the opposite. Similarly, in an area zoned Single Family Dwelling, (SFD), a successful 
application to change zoning that reduces the wealth of one or more existing homeowners may or may 
not improve overall welfare as we saw above. Is insurance against a loss in property value due to 
externalities a substitute for the existence of zoning (or rezoning where zoning exists)? Fair insurance 
should generate a premium that reflects the probability of the state where the loss may occur and the 
expected size of the loss (Note 6). The choice to buy insurance against a possible loss may have no 
impact on expected wealth but it does improve the level of utility enjoyed by the individual who elects 
to insure due to the existence of diminishing marginal utility associated with the assumption of risk 
aversion.  
The issue of risk avoidance has been raised frequently in the literature addressing the history of zoning. 
Christine Boyer (1983) notes, “… zoning was intended instead to secure the interest of property owners 
by enhancing the economic stability of home ownership” (p. 153) and that if zoning was viewed as “... 
insurance policy that the single family homeowner’s investment be protected in a stable neighborhood” 
(p. 148). An econometric analysis of Chicago land prices following the first 1923 zoning ordinance 
concluded, “… residential land owners valued the insurance that zoning provides against future 
intrusions of conflicting commercial land use.” McMillen and McDonald (2002, p. 630). 
It is reasonable however, to assume that homeowners have a strong desire for stable or rising property 
values. In an urban growth scenario, the pressure for higher population densities drives up residential 
land values creating, for some homeowners, the opportunity to reap a significant capital gain if their 
property can be rezoned from single family dwelling to high density residential. Those homeowners 
with a low preference for a “stable” neighborhood and high preference for wealth will accept the 
conversion of their property from single family dwelling to high density which in turn may reduce the 
property values of homeowners adjacent to the rezoned property. Zoning is therefore a form of 
insurance against such a non-conforming use at the expense of a capital gain for other homeowners in 
the neighborhood. If there is a social welfare function that favors high population density, zoning is an 
impediment to achieving welfare gains (Note 7). It is important to emphasize that property value 
insurance does not ensure there will be no change in wealth (Note 8).  
 
4. Implementing Insurance  
Insurance programs to protect homeowners’ equity have been implemented in the past. None of them 
have focussed on the issue of insurance to protect homeowner equity in instances where 
non-conforming land use imposes a capital loss on the homeowner due to negative externalities 
associated with the non-conforming land use. As noted in the introduction, the idea of home equity 
insurance to address negative externalities associated with rezoning has been suggested by several 
researchers. In most cases, the complexities of implementation appear to outweigh the benefits. The 
major impediments are as follow.  
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1) Insurance against a decline in property value due to externalities arising from rezoning would 
have to address the potential problem of moral hazard where the homeowner, faced with a 
rezoning application for the construction of a non-conforming building, would encourage the 
rezoning knowing that she/he would be moving away. 
2) In a similar vein, a developer of proposed high-rise student residences might pay some of the 
near-by single family residences to support the project at a rezoning hearing.  
3) The selection of an appropriate “price index” to base the pay-out decision is difficult (Case, 
Shiller and Weiss, 1993).  
4) Insurance may lead to the approval of rezoning application leading to development not in the 
best interests of the neighborhood in the long run but is unopposed because of third party 
insurance.  
5) The cost of insurance against homeowner property devaluation due to rezoning would be 
expensive. 
6) It is not possible to obtain a reasonable estimate of the probability a given homeowner would 
experience rezoning impacting the value of her/his property.  
While there is merit to elements of these arguments, the insurance option should be afforded greater 
attention not only in terms of equity and fairness but also as a means to improve economic efficiency in 
two ways. First, the ability to rezone property may result in welfare gains for a community that would 
occur in the presence of insurance. Second, homeowner’s insurance in the presence of negative 
externalities would greatly reduce the significant resources that are now marshalled against land use 
change. Insurance would clearly reduce the level of “NIMBY” activity on the part of homeowners who 
may be affected negatively from a rezoning proposal. Even in situations where it may be difficult to 
clearly identify negative externalities, home-owners, going back to the early part of the 20th century, 
have viewed zoning as their “guarantee” of conformity. To rezone a property for activity that may have 
negative effects on a neighborhood is to violate a covenant between the home owner and the local 
government.  
There are no aggregate statistics on the cost of addressing a re-zoning application across the United 
States or Canada. However, one example will identify the breadth of the costs involved. In the Province 
of Ontario, Canada, rezoning applications not resolved at the local government level are often appealed 
to the Ontario Municipal Board (Ontario, 2014). In 2012-2013, the board reviewed close to 2000 
appeals. The length of each appeal ranged from 1 day to more than 10 days. A weighted average of the 
number of days for each appeal is approximately 4 days. There are no statistics on the cost of appeals 
but given that approximately 8,000 appeal days occurred in 2012-2013 and if we assume there were 2 
representatives for the plaintiff, the private cost alone would be in the order of $ 24 million.  
The public cost, that is, the annual public administrative costs to operate the Ontario Municipal Board 
was $18 million (Note 9). To those figures, one would have to add the cost of hearing the application 
for rezoning which would likely be at least 2000 days (one day per application) with attending costs of 
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private counsel and local government legal counsel in addition to the time at the staff level of local 
government. A very rough and conservative estimate might be $ 10 M province wide. If similar costs 
prevailed across Canada and the United States, it is not inconceivable that the cost of addressing 
rezoning applications could cost more than $ 1 B annually. The point of this exercise is to underscore 
the inefficiency of the current system of dealing with rezoning.  
The argument there is insufficient data to calculate the probability of rezoning one or more properties 
impacting the value of adjacent properties lacks merit. There are literally thousands of examples of 
rezoning every year in any major city. A sufficiently large number of statistical studies in various 
countries have been undertaken to provide a reasonable data base to provide both the qualitative link 
between homeowner property prices and non-conformities and the quantitative nature of these effects 
(Baranzini et al., 2008; Colwell, Gujral, & Coley, 1985; Kinard & Kickey, 1995, 2000). 
 
5. Conclusion 
Appeals against property rezoning are very costly and achieve little to address the real risk 
home-owners face when they purchase residential property: the risk a local government or higher-tiered 
government decision will depreciate their asset. While current studies on the actual impact of negative 
externalities on property value are limited, there are data bases in most municipalities yielding the 
statistics to make reasonable assumptions to develop a fair insurance system to protect homeowners 
from a loss in property value due to the decisions of local governments that would create negative 
externalities due to the creation of non-conforming land use policy.  
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Notes 
Note 1. The authors wish to thank Michael Hoy and Ray Rees for their insightful comments on an 
earlier draft of this paper. 
Note 2. It is assumed that the satisfaction of the owner of each property increases when her/his property 
value increases and decreases when the value declines. There is no interpersonal comparison of utility. 
Note 3. While a Pigou-type tax to address the negative externalities may be theoretically attractive, it 
would be difficult if not impossible to implement. 
Note 4. It is assumed that this and other utility representations depict the usual properties of risk 
aversion and a preference for asset diversification.  
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Note 5. The probability of state 2 can be endogenous depending on the degree to which those 
challenging the proposal to rezone take action, at a cost, to stop the rezoning. A land owner is faced 
with two probabilities.  
Note 6. Calculating the probability a state occurs where non-conforming externalities reduce the value 
of adjacent properties is one of the practical issues in the design of insurance. The issue is addressed 
subsequently. 
Note 7. An example of this is the policy of the Government of the Province of Ontario to impose 
population density targets in cities that are deemed to be high growth centers.  
Note 8. Fair market insurance requires the deduction of the premium in any calculation of the net 
change in wealth. The following hypothetical example underscores this point. Given risk aversion, an 
insurance premium and loss of value of $4 converts wealth uncertainty to one of wealth certainty.  
Impact of Fair Market Insurance on Wealth of Potential Losers. 
Assumptions: A1=200; A2=160; π=0.9 
Value of Property : No Insurance Fair Insurance Against State A2  
A1 occurs A2 occurs A1 occurs A2 occurs 
200 160 200-4*=196 160+40-4=196 
Note 9. In 2017, the Ontario government replaced the Ontario Municipal Board (“OMB”) with a new 
Local Planning Appeal Tribunal (“LPAT”). The most important change is the elimination of the 
OMB’s power to substitute its decision for decisions made by a municipality or its committees. 
 
